



CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF NOTICE

J-7
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CJCS Notice 3500.01
12 January 2017

2017-2020 CHAIRMAN'S JOINT TRAINING GUIDANCE

References: See Enclosure A

1. Purpose. This notice provides the annual Chairman's Joint Training Guidance to all DoD Components for planning, executing, and assessing joint training for fiscal years (FY) 2017 to 2020 to align with the Guidance for Employment of the Force (GEF), National Military Strategy (NMS), and Joint Strategic Campaign Plan (JSCP). The intent of this guidance is to translate the NMS and incorporate near and midterm JSCP objectives into an actionable framework that reorients our organizations, processes, training, and exercises to address the changing character of war.
2. Superseded/Cancellation. CJCS Notice (CJCSN) 3500.01, 30 October 2014, 2015-2018 Chairman's Joint Training Guidance, is hereby superseded.
3. Applicability. This CJCSN applies to Combatant Commands (CCMD), Services, the National Guard Bureau, combat support agencies (CSA), Joint Staff directorates, and other joint organizations.
4. Strategic Environment. The Joint Force faces an increasingly complex global security environment characterized by contested norms and persistent disorder. Revisionist state and non-state actors seek to challenge the current international order by establishing new rules and norms that are unfavorable to our national interests. Weak states are increasingly incapable of maintaining domestic order, which permits other actors to employ violence in pursuit of their beliefs. The use of new technologies, information, and asymmetric approaches by a range of competitors will allow them to avoid our strengths and exploit perceived vulnerabilities. Conflicts are increasingly transregional, multi-domain, and multi-functional (TMM) as potential adversaries' interests, influence, capabilities, and reach extend beyond single geographic areas and domains.

5. Essential Characteristics. In order to adapt to the changing strategic environment, the following four essential characteristics should be incorporated into all joint training programs:

a. Joint training must reflect the strategic environment and its respective challenges. Joint training programs and exercise scenarios should portray realistic adversaries that possess near-peer capabilities, pose a nuclear threat, compete transregionally and in multiple domains, use asymmetric approaches, integrate multiple functions, and shape the information environment to accomplish their objectives.

b. Joint training must emphasize global integration across the 4+1 challenges (Russia, China, Iran, North Korea, and violent extremist organizations). Joint training programs must challenge the Joint Force at every level to synchronize effects quickly and decisively across domains, geographic boundaries, functions, and authorities. Increased focus on global integration of joint capabilities and forces in training will help identify potential gaps; improve shared understanding among the CCMDs, CSA, the Joint Staff, and interorganizational partners; provide a better framework for making timely and effective decisions; and improve the integration of strategy, planning, operations, and assessments.

c. Joint training must span the range of military operations. The Joint Force must be responsive, flexible, and resilient. Today's strategic environment does not give us the luxury of focusing on one problem. The five priority challenges outlined in the NMS provide a framework to determine required capabilities and capacities and assess Comprehensive Joint Readiness. Using this framework within our joint training programs also enables the Joint Force to confirm its ability to execute all required missions in the strategic environment, ranging from the five priority challenges to defense of the homeland and support to civil authorities. Reorienting from a regional construct to one that addresses our priority strategic challenges through a global lens enables the Joint Force to be better positioned to advance national interests. Joint training programs need to reflect a diversity of missions, including the ability to fight and win major operations and campaigns against near-peer competitors. Training across the full range of military operations ensures the Joint Force can provide a complete set of options to national leadership.

d. Joint training must enable the Joint Force to innovate. The Joint Force's ability to adapt and innovate faster than the enemy is essential in the strategic environment. Adversaries are developing new capabilities, leveraging commercial technology to compete in domains in which the Joint Force has historically maintained an advantage, and using information and asymmetric means to compete below the historical U.S. response threshold. The goal in

training is to confront leaders with similar challenges that require organizations to adapt, innovate, and seek opportunities to counter global threat networks. Furthermore, lessons learned must become “lessons applied” to create a strategic advantage for the Joint Force.

6. Required Joint Training Elements. The strategic environment and essential characteristics listed above require eight overarching joint training elements for the Joint Force. These eight overarching required elements are operational areas that need focused attention within joint training programs to achieve desired effects within the joint operational and informational environment.

a. Transregional Joint Training. Every priority strategic challenge is transregional in nature, as potential adversaries’ interests, influence, capabilities, and reach extend beyond single geographic regions. Joint training must specifically address the higher-level collaboration of the Joint Staff with OSD, as well as horizontal coordination among CCMDs, to achieve desired effects.

b. Multi-domain Joint Training. The Joint Force must compete and win in every domain: air, land, sea, space, and cyberspace, as well as the overall information environment. Adversaries continue to innovate and adapt in these domains to erode U.S. advantages. Future joint, multi-domain training needs to be enabled by increased reliance on distributed, synthetic training (live/constructive) using secure/protected networks supported by common foundational architectures and standards. Improving joint training approaches and exercise scenarios for contested domains and emphasizing cross-domain synergy throughout joint training programs will develop a Joint Force that can think and operate in this multi-domain environment.

c. Multi-functional Joint Training. Overlapping crises and increased adversary capabilities place competing demands on finite critical joint resources, such as intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR), cyberspace operations, space operations, information operations (and the special access program equivalents), cruise and ballistic missile defense, and joint logistics. The Joint Force should replicate these challenges within training programs, including the processes for prioritizing and allocating high-demand, low-density forces and capabilities.

d. Partner Integration in Joint Training. The Joint Force must continue to mature a network of willing and capable training partners, including interagency, industry, and non-governmental organizations, to succeed in this operating environment. CCMDs and Services best leverage the capabilities of organizational, allied nation, and other mission partners through training programs that exercise and capitalize on their contributions to the mission. CCMDs will prioritize combined exercises with likely partners for joint

contingency operations to enhance interoperability, maintain readiness, build partner capacity and assurance, and improve regional access and understanding.

e. Contested Environments in Joint Training. Training scenarios and exercises should reflect advanced contested environments and the impact of potential attrition on the Joint Force. Multiple competitors are using contested environment strategies to limit U.S. options. The proliferation of threats in the future security environment requires the Joint Force to maintain operational effectiveness while absorbing successful attacks (e.g. loss of force projection assets; degraded Position, Navigation, and Timing; space; Command and Control (C2) systems; and reduced access to the electro-magnetic spectrum). Countering these strategies and gaining proficiency in strategic and operational movement and maneuver requires multiple agencies and CCMDs to plan, train, exercise, and execute together.

f. Conventional and SOF Interoperability in Joint Training. The current strategic environment is compressing decision cycles and response times. Therefore, training programs must emphasize special operations and conventional force integration, interoperability, and interdependence so that forces arrive in theater prepared to operate as part of a joint team in a contested environment across multiple domains.

g. Joint Force Leaders in Joint Training. A Joint Force composed of agile and adaptive leaders and organizations who can innovate and critically think through dynamic problems in an increasingly TMM threat environment remains fundamental to the success of the Joint Force. The Joint Force's aim must be to develop, educate, and train leaders to fully understand the TMM threat environment, anticipate and adapt to uncertainty, and operate with mutual trust in fellow leaders that are empowered through mission command. These strong joint leaders of character will need to think critically and strategically, and confidently address the toughest problems to assure future success.

h. Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction in Joint Training. Actors of concern pose a threat of developing, acquiring, proliferating, or employing weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and related capabilities: expertise, materials, technologies, and means of delivery. These activities present a clear threat to the strategic objectives of the United States. State or non-state adversaries may use WMD to exploit U.S. power projection, sustainment, and force protection vulnerabilities, or deny access to an area or region. The Joint Force must ensure that the United States, allied nations, and its partners are neither attacked nor coerced by adversaries with WMD. Exercises and training should prepare the Joint Force to conduct CWMD activities, including: preventing the proliferation of WMD and its associated technologies; preventing

new WMD development; securing and reducing WMD stockpiles; deterring the use of WMD, and disrupting or defeating WMD programs.

7. Key Actions. The Joint Force's current approach to integrating CCMD, Joint Staff, DoD, and USG exercises and activities in the global strategic environment is insufficient to advance U.S. national interests and provide an effective hedge against future uncertainty. The Joint Force will initiate the following key actions:

a. Enhance Global Integration through Joint Training. The Joint Force will orient training programs to align with the GEF, NMS, and JSCP to address the priority strategic challenges and homeland defense. The Joint Force must improve shared understanding of the strategies, decision-making, methods of operating, and capabilities of the most compelling strategic threats. This approach ensures the Joint Force's posture, capabilities, and processes support national interests by "setting the globe" in support of the Secretary of Defense.

(1) The Joint Force will create a portfolio of exercises associated with each priority strategic challenge and related plans.

(2) The Joint Force will conduct exercises involving multiple CCMDs, the Joint Staff, and appropriate CSAs oriented on the priority strategic challenges and homeland defense. Exercises strengthen the "connective tissue" between leaders and organizations, validate assumptions, examine globally integrated operation and other mature concepts, test key ideas, and confirm the Joint Force can execute assigned missions. These exercises will include a high level of national leader involvement that integrates policies, authorities, and whole-of-government actions. Exercises develop and improve capabilities, and may identify capability gaps. (A Notice covering enhancing global integration will be published separately as an update to the CJTG and as a section within the Chairman's Joint Training Manual, CJCSM 3500.03.)

(3) CCMDs will leverage joint training to assure partners, deter potential adversaries, position the Joint Force to respond to contingencies, and advance U.S. national interests.

b. Joint Staff Training. The Joint Staff will establish a training program designed to improve its ability to integrate global activities, resources, strategy, and risk management, and provide best military advice. This program will involve a series of tabletop exercises, senior leader seminars, and wargames culminating in an annual event linked to a CCMD Tier 1 exercise that enables the Joint Staff to exercise internal strategic decision-making and global synchronization processes. (Joint Staff Training program will be published separately as a section within CJCSM 3500.03)


c. Leader Development. We must place the highest value on developing leaders that prove adept at solving tough dynamic problems. Our methods must produce senior leaders who take the initiative, can operate globally, and can integrate joint and interagency capability across multiple domains—and do so in a state of dynamic complexity and great uncertainty. Training environments create opportunities for subordinates to increase their understanding and experience for global integrated operations and strengthens their ability to work effectively with the Joint Staff, CCMDs, Services, interagency, and Allies and partners, to address global integration/TMM threats. (Leader Development White Paper will be published separately.)

d. Resources. The Joint Training Enterprise, through the Combatant Commanders Exercise Engagement and Training Transformation program, will review our approach to balancing and resourcing training activities for the priority strategic challenges. (Resources instructions will be published separately as a section within the Chairman’s Joint Training Resources for the Armed Forces of the United States Manual, CJCSM 3511.01.)

8. Conclusion. The 2017 to 2020 CJTG supports the NMS by highlighting four essential characteristics and eight required elements of joint training to prepare the Joint Force for globally integrated operations in a TMM environment. Follow-on publications on enhancing global integration through joint training, joint staff training, leader development, and resources will provide supplemental instruction to support full implementation of this guidance.

9. Releasability. UNRESTRICTED. This directive is approved for public release; distribution is unlimited on NIPRNET. Department of Defense (DoD) Components (to include the Combatant Commands), other Federal agencies, and the public, may obtain copies of this directive through the Internet from the CJCS Directives Electronic Library at: http://www.dtic.mil/cjcs_directives. Joint Staff activities may also obtain access via the SIPR Directives Electronic Library Websites.

10. Effective Date. This Notice is effective upon receipt.



JOSEPH F. DUNFORD, JR.
General, U.S. Marine Corps

Enclosure
A – References

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ENCLOSURE A

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